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The European Union launched its first comprehensive better-regulation agenda in 
2002 and has since then been constantly modifying and improving its toolkit aimed at 
guaranteeing the quality of its legislation. The first better-regulation agenda followed 
the pioneering experience of some of its member states and introduced a formal 
procedure of ex ante impact assessment (IA) as well as minimum criteria for stakeholder 
consultation.1 Different variables explain the rise of EU-level IA, such as reactions to 
the overuse of the precautionary principle in risk analysis and health policy (especially 
in chemicals and tobacco);2 pressure from finance ministers in countries such as the 
U.K. and the Netherlands to introduce evidence-based procedures in policy formulation, 
thus increasing accountability;3 and organizational developments within the European 
Commission, with an expansion to regulatory policy of tools originally crafted for 
sustainable development policies.4 
The EU IA model was introduced together with a communication aimed at simplifying 
and improving the regulatory environment and promoting “a culture of dialogue and 
1 
Prior to that, there had been pilot programs on business test panels and cost assessment, as well as different 
types of tests on policy proposals that were not integrated in a single template. Andrea Renda, “Impact 
Assessment in the EU: the State of the Art and the Art of the State,” Monograph, CEPS (2006). 
2 
See, inter alia, K.E. Smith et al., “Working the System”—British American Tobacco’s Influence on the 
European Union Treaty and Its Implications for Policy: An Analysis of Internal Tobacco Industry Documents,” 
PLOS Medicine 7, 1 (2010). The precautionary principle implies that the introduction of a new product or 
process whose ultimate effects are disputed or unknown should be resisted. According to the European 
Commission, the precautionary principle may be invoked when a phenomenon, product or process may have 
a dangerous effect, identified by a scientific and objective evaluation, if this evaluation does not allow the risk 
to be determined with sufficient certainty. Recourse to the principle belongs in the general framework of risk 
analysis, and more particularly in the context of risk management, which corresponds to the decision-making 
phase.
3 
C.M. Radaelli and A.C.M. Meuwese, “Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through Impact 
Assessment in the EU,” West European Politics 33, 1 (2010): 136-153.
4 
T.F. Ruddy and L.M. Hilty, “Impact assessment and policy learning in the European Commission,” 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 28 (2008): 90–105.
1participation” within the EU legislative process.5 As a result, the commission decided to integrate 
all forms of ex ante evaluation and various tests by building an integrated impact-assessment 
model, to enter into force on Jan. 1, 2003.6 This model was tasked with the heavy responsibility of 
ensuring that adequate account was taken, at an early stage of the regulatory process, of both the 
competitiveness and sustainable-development goals, which ranked among the top priorities on the 
EU agenda.
Over the past 14 years, the better-regulation toolkit of the European Commission has been 
strengthened from a methodological standpoint, and expanded into a more comprehensive system 
that involves ex ante IAs, ex post evaluations, “fitness checks” focused on clusters of laws, and 
cumulative cost assessments that address specific industry sectors. At the same time, the system 
gradually involved other institutions, such as the European Parliament (especially from 2012) and, 
to a lesser degree, the Council. And in May 2015, the European Commission further re-launched 
the system with a much stronger emphasis on ex ante political validation of proposals, stakeholder 
consultation at all phases of the policy process, and comprehensive, well-structured retrospective 
reviews. The European Commission has completed more than 1,000 IAs since 2003 and this 
provides a solid basis for observing the main virtues and challenges of the system as it has evolved 
to date. 
This paper looks at the lessons that can be drawn from the EU experience and highlights the 
challenges that have been successfully addressed and the ones that still remain unsolved. In 
discussing challenges, reference will be made to other legal systems, such as those in the United 
States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. The paper also discusses the main novelties 
introduced by the recently adopted new EU Better Regulation Package, as well as the content of the 
proposed new Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking, both presented by the European 
Commission on May 19, 2015. 
Section 1 of the paper analyzes the current role played by major EU institutions in better 
lawmaking and aspects of the current inter-institutional agreement that would be worth 
reconsidering. Key issues include the use of ex ante impact assessments in major EU institutions; 
the frequency, timing and relevance of stakeholder consultation throughout the policy process; 
problems related to the ex post evaluation, fitness checks and other forms of analyses of the stock 
of legislation (e.g., cumulative cost assessments). Section 2 focuses on methodology and discusses 
the taxonomy of costs and benefits that is now the basis for both ex ante impact assessments and 
ex post evaluations, including fitness checks and cumulative cost assessments. Section 3 briefly 
summarizes the main activities carried out in the realm of financial regulation and describes the 
recent consultation launched by the European Commission for a thorough revision of the whole 
stock of legislation in this domain. Section 4 concludes by briefly comparing the EU experience 
with the Canadian one. 
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During 2002 and early in 2003, the commission developed its action plan through eight targeted communications, 
at the same time defining with the European Parliament and the council an overall strategy on better law-making. 
The communications addressed the following issues: 1) General principles and minimum standards for consultation 
(COM(2002)704); 2) the collection and use of expertise (COM(2002) 713); 3) impact assessment (COM(2002) 276), 
including internal guidelines; 4) simplifying and improving the regulatory environment (COM(2002) 278); 5) a proposal for 
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718); 7) a framework for target-based tripartite contracts (COM(2002) 709); and 8) better monitoring of the application of 
community law (COM(2002) 725).
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“Impact assessment is intended to integrate, reinforce, streamline and replace all the existing separate impact assessment 
mechanisms for Commission proposals.” See the commission’s communication on impact assessment, COM (2002) 276, 
June 5, 2002, Section 1.3. 
21. THE USE OF EX ANTE IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN MAJOR  
 EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
The European Commission is the leading EU institution in which ex ante impact assessment has 
been more successfully mainstreamed into the policy process. Renda7 distinguishes between 
three main “eras” in the EU better-regulation agenda, and more specifically in the use of impact 
assessment: (i) the early years (2003—2005); (ii) the re-launch of the system and the “plateauing 
era” (2006-2009); and (iii) the consolidation era (2009-2014), which led to the transition towards 
smart regulation and then the regulatory fitness (REFIT) agenda. As discussed below, a fourth era 
has just begun with the Juncker Commission and the recently adopted Better Regulation Package. 
In June 2002, the European Commission launched a first integrated impact assessment (IIA) 
procedure, which incorporated not only the economic impact, but also the social and environmental 
impact of the proposals concerned. The IIA applied to all major initiatives included in the 
commission’s annual policy cycle. However, the first years led to mixed results, due to both 
methodological and procedural reasons. Accordingly, after a first review of the impact-assessment 
system, in March 2005 a new communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the 
European Union laid down important changes in the IIA procedure and re-launched the role of IA 
and better regulation as part of the Lisbon strategy. The communication’s vibrant statement on the 
need to boost better-regulation initiatives at all levels resulted in the launch of three key actions, 
to be reviewed in 2007, devoted to: a) the design and application of better-regulation tools at the 
EU level; b) a closer collaboration with member states to ensure a consistent application of better-
regulation principles; and c) a stronger, constructive dialogue with all EU regulators, member states 
and other stakeholders. After a public consultation, in December 2010 the European Commission 
adopted a new communication that spelled out the commission’s new priorities for what is now 
called the “smart regulation” agenda. The term “smart” was used to denote a preference towards 
simpler regulation and possibly to a competitiveness-enhancing use of regulation with the 
minimum possible use of red tape. The communication announces a number of new features in the 
impact-assessment system, in particular:
• The need to “close the policy cycle” by ensuring that proposals that have been assessed ex 
ante are also monitored over time and evaluated ex post after a number of years, to check 
whether the rules in place have achieved the intended results. This evolution was integrated 
with new guidelines issued by the secretariat general of the European Commission on ex post 
evaluation, now part of the Better Regulation Guidelines adopted on May 19, 2015. 
• The re-cast of the administrative-burdens-reduction program and its combination with 
simplification initiatives, with the acknowledgment of the work performed by the High Level 
Group on administrative burdens chaired by Edmund Stoiber, which acted as a stimulus 
for reforms that would cut red tape for the business sector in particular. The commission 
announced that it was “on track to exceed its target of cutting red tape by 25% by 2012,” as 
it had tabled proposals that, if adopted, would generate annual savings of 38 billion euros for 
European companies out of a total estimated burden of 124 billion euros — a reduction of 31 
per cent; after a few years the commission claimed to have gone even beyond the target by 
achieving a 33 per cent reduction in administrative burdens. 
• The idea that smart regulation is a shared responsibility and that, accordingly, the European  
Commission can try to improve the quality of its documents as much as possible, but if  
the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and member states do not take action to  
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3accompany this ongoing development, the impact on the final quality and smartness of EU 
legislation would be limited. 
• The need to strengthen the consideration of SMEs in the policy process by refining tools 
such as the “SME test” that was introduced in the IA system after the adoption in 2008 
of the Small Business Act for Europe, but which had not been fully operationalized 
in methodological terms by the European Commission to date. The smart regulation 
communication was then followed by a review of the Small Business Act in 2011 and, in 
2013, by two important initiatives: (i) a consultation and subsequent report on the top 10 most 
burdensome pieces of EU legislation for European SMEs;8 and (ii) the introduction of a new 
annual scoreboard that will allow the tracking of progress in the legislative cycle of proposals 
where a significant impact on SMEs can be expected, and will also show how different 
approaches to implementation by member states affect the overall impact on SMEs.
All in all, however, the smart-regulation era of the European Commission was heavily affected 
by a slowdown in the impact-assessment activity of commission directorate generals (only 51 IAs 
were concluded in 2010, against the 135 initially planned) and also by a growing tension between 
the approach advocated by the secretariat general, centred around the use of cost-benefit analysis 
and the need — strongly felt by some directorate generals of the European Commission — to 
depart from this method to develop more specific techniques, which would lead in some cases to a 
narrower approach (e.g., the focus on administrative burdens or compliance costs) or to a broader 
approach, very close to a multi-criteria analysis. This radical divergence has led, over time, to a 
worrying fragmentation of the IA system in the European Commission.
1.1 The 2015 better-regulation package
More than a decade after the launch of the EU’s first comprehensive better-regulation package, it is 
fair to state that the system has produced mixed results. The main criticisms referred to the lack of 
quality of some impact-assessment documents; uncertainties over the methodology to be applied; 
the lack of an independent oversight body; the lack of consultation on draft impact assessments; 
and the short life of impact assessment documents, due to the absence of real evaluation capacity 
in the Council of the EU. In May 2015, the European Commission adopted a new better-regulation 
package, which introduced some significant changes. In particular: 
• The European Commission launched a new permanent consultation platform termed 
“Lighten the load — have your say,” which constitutes an open channel for anyone willing 
to provide views on aspects of EU legislation that they find irritating, burdensome or worthy 
of improvement. At the same time, the communication “better regulation for better results” 
also announced the creation of a REFIT stakeholder platform, which will involve high-level 
experts from business and civil-society stakeholders, as well as from all 28 member states 
appointed through an “open and transparent process.” 
• For matters concerning the scrutiny of draft impact assessments, the new features introduced 
by the better-regulation package are potentially far-reaching. First, the Impact Assessment 
Board is being replaced by a Regulatory Scrutiny Board, in which members will now operate 
full time, and which will now include one chairperson (with the rank of director general), 
three “internal” members, as well as three members (up from the two previously announced) 
recruited with fixed-term contracts on the basis of their specific academic competence 
8 
COM(2013)446, June 18, 2013.
4and expertise “via rigorous and objective selection procedures.”9 For the first time, the 
commission thus agreed to open the doors of its watchdog to external members: as a general 
rule, all members of the board should act independently and autonomously and should 
“disclose any potential conflict of interest to the Chairperson and can be requested not to 
participate in the scrutiny of any impact assessments or evaluations or fitness checks where 
such potential conflict of interest arises.”10 
• Moreover, the commission’s communication announces that the commission will start 
consulting before and even “during the impact assessment process.” This would happen 
after the publication of a new “inception impact assessment” document, which appears to 
be a somewhat more elaborate version of the “roadmap” that so far has been produced by 
the commission for each initiative on the occasion of the publication of the yearly work 
program.11 What is still unclear is whether this procedure will be mandatory for all proposals 
subject to impact assessment and at what state of advancement of the proposal consultation 
would be run. 
• Finally, the new Better Regulation Communication marks a long-awaited step forward on the 
application of better-regulation tools to delegated acts, the thousands of regulatory decisions 
that are taken every year to ensure the implementation of primary legislation. As a matter of 
fact, these rules are more similar to the types of rules on which regulatory impact analysis 
(RIA) is mandatory in the United States and Canada. 
All in all, these are important changes, which — if properly implemented — would likely stimulate 
a more constructive dialogue during the early stage of policy formulation and ex ante policy 
appraisal within the European Commission, and as such, with the usual caveats, must be welcomed. 
Implementation of these changes must however be swift: at the time of writing, almost one year 
after the better-regulation package was presented, members of the REFIT stakeholder platforms 
have recently been appointed, but the new Regulatory Scrutiny Board is still incomplete, especially 
for what concerns the independent members. 
At the same time, the European Commission proposed a revision of the 2003 Inter-Institutional 
Agreement on Better Law-Making and of the later 2005 Inter-Institutional Common Approach to 
Impact Assessment, which would in principle have led the European Parliament and the Council 
to carry out systematic impact assessments of their proposed major amendments on commission 
proposals. As already recalled, while the European Parliament actually started carrying out impact 
assessments since 2012 and has, since then, tried to step up its analytical efforts by gradually 
upgrading its workforce and sharpening its toolkit, the Council has remained virtually silent on this 
issue. 
The proposed new Inter-Institutional Agreement introduces three new features. First, the 
commission commits to run an eight-week consultation after the adoption of every proposal, in 
order to collect comments and opinions that would then be sent to the other EU institutions to 
facilitate their appraisal work. This consultation should, in principle, add to the one that will be 
carried out “during” the impact assessment process, as the commission has now proposed to carry 
out consultation on “inception IAs.” Second, the commission declared its availability to assist the 
9 
Communication, page 7, Section 3.2. “Three members will be officials selected from within the Commission services. 
Three posts will be created, therefore, for officials who will work full time exclusively for the Board and be transparently 
selected on the basis of their expertise in accordance with prevailing Commission rules. They will be ranked as Director, 
Principal Adviser or Adviser. Three temporary posts will be created to permit the recruitment of the members from outside 
the Commission on the basis of their proven academic expertise in impact assessment, ex-post evaluation and regulatory 
policy generally.”
10 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board, “Missions, Tasks and Staff,” (Strasbourg, May 19, 2015), 3.
11 
It is defined as a “Roadmap for initiatives subject to an IA that sets out in greater detail the description of the problem, 
issues related to subsidiarity, the policy objectives and options as well as the likely impacts of each option.”
5European Parliament and the Council in their assessment of the impacts, in particular by explaining 
in detail its impact assessment, sharing the data used, and even — in duly defined cases — 
integrating its impact assessment. And third, the commission proposes to establish a right for any 
of the three institutions to call for an independent panel of three experts (each one appointed by a 
different EU institution) that would carry out an assessment of the impacts of proposals that have 
been substantially revised compared to the original text proposed by the European Commission. 
The desired outcome is clear: whatever the way this result is achieved, the commission is trying 
to ensure that the impact of the final piece of legislation is assessed, and that such assessment 
is used for future evaluation work, thus helping to complete the so-called “policy cycle.” While 
this statement does not attribute any specific responsibility to any of the three institutions, the 
stated outcome (if taken seriously) would represent a clear step towards the completion of a fully 
evidence-backed policy cycle in the EU. 
2. THE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING IMPACTS: A LOOK AT THE COSTS  
 AND BENEFITS OF REGULATION
The new EU better-regulation guidelines that accompanied the new better-regulation package 
contain a new taxonomy of costs and benefits, accompanied by dedicated guidance on how to 
assess each category of cost and benefit. This taxonomy is now becoming the basis for all ex ante 
impact assessments and ex post evaluations, be they related to an individual piece of legislation, or 
to a group of laws (as in REFIT exercises and in cumulative-cost assessments). 
Regardless of whether RIA is eventually based on a cost-benefit analysis or not, it is always 
essential to identify all relevant direct and indirect costs and benefits that would emerge if the 
available regulatory options are implemented. This can enable a more meaningful comparison of 
regulatory options. Figure 1 below shows a general map of the impacts generated by legal rules. 
This map is intended for ease of visualization of the full landscape of regulatory impacts: as such, it 
should be taken as a tentative exercise, not as an attempt to establish once and for all the categories 
of costs and benefits that can emerge from regulation (as a matter of fact, guidance documents on 
impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis from all over the world show different taxonomies and 
typologies of costs and benefits). 
6FIGURE 1 A MAP OF REGULATORY COSTS AND BENEFITS
Source: Renda et al. (2014) and European Commission (2015)
As shown in the figure, legislation normally produces both direct and indirect impacts, which in 
turn can generate second-order effects (“ultimate impacts”). In more detail, Figure 1 highlights six 
main areas of regulatory impacts. As far as costs are concerned: 
• Area 1 includes direct costs from regulation (DC), such as direct compliance costs and 
hassle/irritation burdens. 
 ◦ Direct compliance costs include:
 ▪ Regulatory charges, which include fees (such as spectrum and licensing), levies (e.g., 
copyright levies), taxes, etc. 
 ▪ Substantive compliance costs, which encompass those investments and expenses 
faced by businesses and citizens in order to comply with substantive obligations or 
requirements contained in a legal rule (e.g., the need to install new equipment to avoid 
interference between co-primary uses of the 700 MHz band); and 
 ▪ Administrative burdens are those costs borne by businesses, citizens, civil society 
organizations and public authorities as a result of administrative activities performed 
to comply with information obligations included in legal rules (e.g., keeping records of 
security incidents and notifying public authorities of each breach of security 
 ◦ Hassle costs are often associated with businesses, but they apply equally well to 
consumers: they include costs associated with waiting time and delays, redundant legal 
provisions, corruption, etc. 
• Area 2 refers to enforcement costs (EC). These costs are often downplayed in ex ante RIA. 
They refer to key phases of a rule’s life, such as monitoring, enforcement and adjudication.  
They include costs related to dispute resolution, litigation, appeals, government inspections, etc.
7• Area 3 encompasses indirect regulatory costs (IC), which refer to costs incurred in 
related markets or experienced by consumers, government agencies or other stakeholders 
that are not under the direct scope of the regulation. These costs are usually transmitted 
through changes in the prices and/or availability and/or quality of the goods or services 
produced in the regulated sector. Changes in these prices then ripple through the rest of the 
economy, causing prices in other sectors to rise or fall, ultimately affecting the welfare of 
consumers.12 These costs also include the so-called “indirect compliance costs” (i.e., costs 
related to the fact that other stakeholders have to comply with legislation) and costs related 
to substitution (e.g., reliance on alternative sources of supply), transaction costs and negative 
impacts on market functioning, such as reduced competition or market access, or reduced 
innovation or investment. For example, if a given auction design generates costs for telecom 
operators, which are likely to be passed on downstream in the form of higher retail prices for 
consumers, this should be counted as an indirect regulatory cost. 
Performing an ex ante RIA requires constant awareness of the fact that total costs arising from a 
given regulation are given by the following sum: (DC + IC + EC). Any assessment that partly or 
fully, intentionally or inadvertently omits the analysis of one or more of these categories of costs 
is likely to provide an incomplete, and thus inaccurate account of the costs generated by the legal 
rule. 
As far as benefits are concerned, Renda et al.13 suggest the following categorization:
• Area 4 includes direct regulatory benefits. Here, the following categories of benefits can be 
distinguished: 
 ◦ The improvement of the well-being of individuals, which in turn encompasses social and 
economic conditions as well as health, environmental and safety improvements; and 
 ◦ Efficiency improvements, which include, notably, cost savings but also information 
availability and enhanced product and service variety for end consumers, and greater 
productivity (as is often the case when a proposal generates enhanced access to, and usage 
of, information and communication technologies). 
• Area 5 includes indirect regulatory benefits, which encompass: 
 ◦ Spillover effects related to third-party compliance with legal rules (so-called “indirect 
compliance benefits”); 
 ◦ Wider macroeconomic benefits, including GDP improvements, productivity 
enhancements, greater employment rates, etc.; and 
 ◦ Other non-monetizable benefits, such as protection of fundamental rights, social cohesion, 
international and national stability, etc.
• Area 6 contains a list of “ultimate impacts” of regulation, which overlap with the ultimate 
goals of regulatory intervention: even if some regulations directly aim at achieving these 
benefits (in which case we would include them in Area 4), normally all regulations aim, 
as an ultimate impact at achieving some advancement in social welfare, which can be 
described in terms of efficiency or in others terms: these ultimate impacts encompass well-
being, happiness and life satisfaction, environmental quality, and more economic goals 
12 
For example, if a given regulation increases the cost of energy production, this will be reflected in the cost structure of a 
number of industries, which might then pass on part of this additional cost downstream along the value chain and eventually 
to end consumers. Similarly, if a certain regulation on the safety of chemical substances entails the withdrawal of certain 
products, downstream users will have to face replacement costs.
13 
Renda, A. et al. (2014), "Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Regulation", Study for the European Commission, Secretariat 
General, available at the Commission's website, at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/commission_guidelines/
docs/131210_cba_study_sg_final.pdf.
8such as GDP growth and employment. This area lies at the intersection between regulatory 
impacts and regulatory goals. It is important to highlight it in a visual representation of 
regulatory impacts for at least two main reasons. First, while the first applications of cost-
benefit analysis to legal rules (as in the U.S. RIA system) chiefly looked at efficiency and 
thus at the calculation of net benefits for the justification of action in regulation, many 
governments today adopt a wider variety of regulatory goals when regulating, which leads 
to the measurement of distributional effects and, more generally, subjective outcomes such 
as life satisfaction. Second, a number of methods are being developed to track directly 
the ultimate impact of a given future state of the world (e.g., life satisfaction), rather than 
developing the analysis from the comparison of costs and benefits. These approaches (often 
termed “measurement of subjective well-being,” or “happiness metrics”) try to avoid some of 
the methodological shortcomings of measurements from neoclassical cost-benefit analyses: 
among other things, an important feature of these methods is that instead of relying on 
income as a proxy of happiness, they try to measure the latter directly.14 The availability of 
broadband for all citizens, for example, can generate impacts in terms of life satisfaction, due 
to the elimination of administrative burdens, and to enhanced communication possibilities. 
The transition towards tele-work is another good example, as it leads to enhanced 
possibilities for those wishing to enjoy family life and reconcile it with working duties. 
2.1 Types of regulatory costs
This section introduces a taxonomy of regulatory costs that the author developed for the European 
Commission in 2014, and was later introduced in the new EU Better Regulation Guidelines adopted 
on May 19, 2015. This taxonomy is broadly consistent with previous work done by the OECD.15 
A cost can be defined as “any item that makes someone worse-off, or reduces a person’s well-
being,” and as such includes also those opportunities that are forgone because a particular policy 
measure has been implemented.16 The practice of impact assessment entails the use of a number 
of different cost concepts. Of these, as suggested by several authorities around the world, the most 
comprehensive measure is that of “social cost,” intended as a reduction of social welfare arising as 
a consequence of a legal rule. Simply put, social cost represents “the total burden that a regulation 
will impose on the economy” and is defined as “the sum of all opportunity costs incurred as a 
result of a regulation,” where an opportunity cost is the value lost to society of any goods and 
services that will not be produced and consumed as a result of a regulation.17 
To be complete, an estimate of costs should include both the opportunity costs of current 
consumption that will be foregone as a result of the regulation and the losses that may result if the 
regulation reduces capital investment and thus future consumption. The strong focus of impact 
assessment on the concept of opportunity cost is explained by the fact that the ultimate impact 
of policies should be measured based on individuals’ well-being: and the latter depends also on 
foregone opportunities.
Moreover, it must be recalled that all costs generated by a new legal provision (just like benefits) 
are by definition incremental costs, i.e., they are additional with respect to the existing situation, as 
14 
See Andrea Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World (Amsterdam: Intersentia, 2011). See also Daniel Fujiwara and 
Ross Campbell, “Valuation Techniques for Social Cost-Benefit Analysis: Stated Preference, Revealed Preference and 
Subjective Well-Being Approaches. A Discussion of the Current Issues, Report for the UK government” (2011),  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209107/greenbook_valuationtechniques.pdf. 
15 
See OECD, OECD Regulatory Compliance Cost Assessment Guidance (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014).
16 
ibid. 
17 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, “Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses,” (December 2010),  
Chapter 8-1. 
9well as additional to the costs that would emerge absent legislative intervention. This means that all 
costs considered for the purposes of an impact assessment should exclude the so-called “business 
as usual” (BAU) costs, i.e., those costs that would materialize anyway, even in absence of a new 
policy measure. 
Typically, costs can be distinguished based on various parameters: 
• The type of cost per se (administrative, compliance costs, charges, non-monetary costs). 
• The relation between the legislative act and the cost considered (direct and indirect costs).
• The frequency of occurrence of the costs (one-off costs, and recurring costs). 
• The degree of certainty of the costs (costs versus risks).
• The nature of the addressee/target of the costs (businesses, citizens/consumers, public 
authorities, third-country actors, etc.). 
• Whether they can be described as economic, social or environmental costs.
As explained above, direct costs can be broken down into compliance costs and hassle costs. 
Below, we describe more in detail each of those types of costs. 
2.1.1 Compliance costs
Compliance costs are often the bulk of all direct costs generated by legislation: over time, they 
have become the subject of specific assessment methods in various countries (e.g., the Netherlands, 
Germany). Within this category, it is possible to distinguish between direct charges, substantive 
compliance costs, and administrative burdens.
2.1.1.1 Charges
Regulation often affects businesses and consumers by imposing the payment of fees, levies, or 
taxes on certain stakeholders. These costs are often easy to calculate as their extent is by definition 
known. What is sometimes more difficult to assess is who will bear those costs as this might 
depend on the extent to which these costs are passed on to entities other than those targeted by the 
legal rule. For example, copyright levies might be passed on downstream to end consumers in the 
form of higher prices for certain hardware devices. 
2.1.1.2 Substantive compliance costs
Regulation normally also entails less explicit costs than direct charges. This is the case of 
substantive compliance costs that emerge as a result of “obligations” included in legislation, 
defined as “individual provisions inducing direct changes in costs, time expenditure or both for 
its addressees,” which “oblige addressees to comply with certain objectives or orders, or to refrain 
from certain actions,” or also “demand cooperation with third parties or to monitor and control 
conditions, actions, figures or types of behaviour.”18 
Compliance costs can be further broken down into the following categories:
• One-off costs: These are faced by actors targeted by regulation since they have to adjust and 
adapt to the changes in the legal rule. For example, if a new environmental standard imposes 
the use of new equipment, the purchase of such new equipment would be needed immediately 
18 
See Federal Government of Germany, Normenkontrollrat and Destatis, “Guidelines on the Identification and Presentation of 
Compliance Costs in Legislative Proposals by the Federal Government” (2011), 8.
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after the legal rule enters into force. Also, personnel will have to be retrained as a result of 
the changes in the legal regime. All these costs are not likely to be borne by the targeted 
stakeholder on a regular basis in the future: to the contrary, they occur only once, after the 
entry into force of the new regulation. 
• Recurrent costs: These are those types of substantive compliance costs that are sustained 
by the targeted stakeholders on a regular basis as a result of the existence of a legal rule 
that imposes specific periodic behaviours. For example, if a new regulation imposes the 
periodical retraining of employees in a specific economic sector (e.g., hospitals, schools), 
then the cost of training courses and the opportunity cost (see below) of the time spent by 
employees being trained will become a regular cost. Similarly, if a new regulation imposes a 
periodical roadworthiness test for cars, mandating that the tests take place every second year 
after the purchase of the vehicle, the cost of the test for the car owner becomes a periodical 
compliance cost. 
Compliance costs are most often calculated as a sum of capital costs, operating costs, and financial 
costs.
• Capital costs (CAPEX) occur when a company acquires or upgrades physical assets such 
as property, industrial buildings or equipment. This type of outlay is made by companies to 
maintain or increase the scope of their operations. These expenditures can include everything 
from repairing a roof to building a brand new factory. Once the asset is in place, capital costs 
generally do not change with the level of activity and are thus functionally equivalent to 
“fixed costs.” In cost-benefit analyses, capital costs are usually “annualized” over the period 
of the useful life of the equipment.
• Operating and maintenance costs (OPEX) include annual expenditures on salaries and 
wages, energy inputs, materials and supplies, purchased services, and maintenance of 
equipment. They are functionally equivalent to “variable costs.”
• Financial costs are costs related to the financing of investment and are thus normally 
considered in relation to CAPEX. However, they can also emerge with respect to OPEX 
whenever a new legal provision changes the structure of the working capital. 
2.1.1.3 Administrative burdens
Administrative burdens are those costs borne by businesses, citizens, civil society organizations 
and public authorities as a result of administrative activities performed to comply with information 
obligations included in legal rules. More specifically, administrative burdens are the part of 
administrative costs caused by regulatory requirements: accordingly, they do not include so-called 
“BAU costs,” i.e., costs that would emerge also in absence of regulation. 
2.1.1.4 “Hassle” or “irritation” costs
Often linked to administrative-burden measurements, irritation costs are a residual category of 
direct cost, which are more difficult to quantify or monetize, and also difficult to relate to a specific 
information obligation. These are more subjectively felt costs that are related to the overlapping 
of regulatory requirements on specific entities, be they citizens or businesses. By definition, 
these costs are important for subjective well-being, but are very difficult to quantify or monetize 
(as such, they are kept as a separate, qualitative item in administrative-burden or compliance-
cost measurement, as in the Netherlands, for example). Hassle costs can include costs related to 
administrative delays (when not directly attributable to an information obligation) and relatedly, the 
opportunity cost of waiting time when dealing with administrative or litigation procedures. At the 
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same time, irritation burdens are often accounted for in the measurement of administrative burdens 
(although they are normally not quantified) whenever they are related to specific information 
obligations, and especially in case of overlaps, redundancies or, even worse, inconsistencies 
between legislative provisions.
2.1.2 Indirect costs
Indirect costs are costs incurred in related markets or experienced by consumers, government 
agencies or other stakeholders that are not under the direct scope of the regulation. These costs 
are transmitted through changes in the prices, the availability and/or the quality of the goods or 
services produced in the regulated sector. Major indirect costs include: indirect compliance costs 
such as regulation-induced price increases, quality/availability reductions and other negative 
impacts related to the fact that someone other than the entity at hand is complying with legislation; 
increased transaction costs; and other secondary costs that include unintended effects, “risk/risk 
trade-offs,” etc.19 
2.1.2.1 Indirect compliance costs
Indirect compliance costs arise to a given agent due to the fact that other agents comply with 
legislation. This type of indirect costs is usually transmitted through changes in the prices of the 
goods or services produced in the regulated sector. Changes in these prices then ripple through 
the rest of the economy, causing prices in other sectors to rise or fall and ultimately affecting the 
welfare of consumers. Government entities can also incur indirect compliance costs. For example, 
if the tax base changes due to the exit of firms from an industry, revenues from taxes or fees may 
decline. One example of indirect compliance cost is found in heavy industries such as steel and 
aluminum: there, the cost of electricity supply for producers is significantly high — among many 
other factors — since price levels also incorporate the cost of emission allowances purchased by 
electricity companies in order to generate electricity: in a recent report on the aluminum industry 
led by CEPS, these indirect costs were estimated at approximately 60 euros per tonne, i.e., 
approximately 45 per cent of regulatory costs for aluminum producers.20 
2.1.2.2 Other indirect costs
Other types of indirect costs, often termed “secondary costs,” are in most cases difficult to typify 
since they are inherently specific to the case at hand. Below, we offer descriptions of some common 
types of costs that arise as a result of regulatory intervention, with no ambition to be exhaustive. 
2.1.2.3 Substitution effects 
Regulation will often cause people to change their behaviour and it is crucial that policy-makers 
understand and anticipate these changes. If regulation results in an increase in the price of a 
product (for example, by increasing product standards), people will usually respond by buying less 
19 
A risk-risk tradeoff is a situation that requires choosing between options where each may cause some harm; a risk-risk 
tradeoff can occur if, as a result of the implementation of a policy option, the remedy chosen reduces some risks but creates 
others. See, inter alia, W. K. Viscusi, “Risk-Risk Analysis,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8 (1994): 5-17, which illustrates 
several examples, including: “Chlorination of water is beneficial since it reduces the spread of a wide variety of diseases, 
but chlorinated water is also carcinogenic.” 
20 
See Andrea Renda et al., Assessment of Cumulative Cost Impact for the Steel and the Aluminium Industry, a report for the 
European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry (CEPS and Economisti Associati, October 2013).
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of that product and switching instead to other substitute goods. Such substitution activity reduces 
the costs in utility terms to consumers, at least in the first instance. However, substitution effects 
may also create unintended problems. For example, reducing risks in one area may create higher 
risks in another.
An example of this is increasing the stringency of airline safety regulation. Such an action can be 
expected to reduce the number of deaths due to plane crashes. However, it will also increase the 
cost of flights. This increase in the cost of flights will cause some people to decide that they can no 
longer afford to fly and to drive to their destination instead. However, because car travel is much 
less safe than air travel, the increase in the number of road crash victims may well be greater than 
the reduction in air crash victims. 
Because of the importance of these substitution effects in determining the overall impact of the 
regulation, officers in charge of an impact assessment should try to identify likely changes of this 
sort and estimate how significant these changes are likely to be, before they draw any conclusion as 
regards the effectiveness of the regulatory options they are assessing. 
2.1.2.4 Transaction costs
Transaction costs are the costs associated with transactions between individuals in the marketplace. 
The smaller the amount of transaction costs, the more market exchanges are considered to be 
potentially efficient. Accordingly, some scholars have advocated in the past that the role of 
government regulation is essentially that of facilitating market transactions by minimizing the 
impact of transaction costs (the so-called “Coase theorem”). Today, the vision of the role of 
government is more articulated, but it can still be argued that, other things being equal, regulation 
that reduces transaction costs is likely to increase efficiency.
Transaction costs relate to many different aspects of a transaction: from the search of a counter-
party to the acquisition of information related to the transaction, to the opportunity cost of the 
time spent negotiating the agreement, the costs related to the strategic behaviour of the parties in a 
contract, etc. Whenever a policy option affects these variables by increasing the cost of identifying 
counter-parties and negotiating with them, the possible inefficiencies generated by transaction costs 
have to be taken into account. 
Transaction costs are often downplayed or even neglected in the analysis of regulatory costs, also 
due to the difficulty of calculating them. In most cases, the measurement of transaction costs can 
take place only through approximations such as the opportunity cost of time spent performing 
given activities (e.g., looking for a counter-party); or through losses of surplus and welfare 
associated with the dissipation of resources (e.g., in the case of strategic behaviour).
2.1.2.5 Reduced competition and inefficient resource allocation
Some regulations can reduce the amount of competition in markets, thus affecting the efficiency 
of resource allocation. This is a particularly important cost impact. For example, regulation can 
reduce competition by: 
• Making it more difficult for new competitors to enter the market, by creating regulatory 
requirements that are difficult for them to meet or simply discouraging entry by artificially 
reducing the profitability of a given market. 
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• Preventing firms from competing aggressively — for example by setting rules that reduce 
price competition or restrict advertising (e.g., rules that prohibit sales below cost, or set 
minimum prices); or depriving market players of their minimum efficient scale by imposing 
market fragmentation. 
• Inducing collusion, by making it easier for market players to co-ordinate their strategies, 
e.g., through increased market transparency, imposed price changes, mandatory standards 
adoption, etc. 
2.1.2.6 Reduced market access
Certain regulations might also have, as an indirect negative impact, the loss of market access 
opportunities for both consumers and businesses. For example, practices and conduct such as 
the abuse of economic dependence can reduce the possibility, for small suppliers, of having their 
products distributed by large supermarket chains: the weaker bargaining position of these players 
vis-à-vis large retailers might lead to a loss of market access for these suppliers, and a consequent 
loss of product variety for consumers. These behaviours are normally not tackled by competition 
law, but several member states of the EU have regulation in place to avoid the issue of smaller 
market players being harmed by the superior bargaining strength of their counter-parties. 
2.1.2.7 Reduced investment and innovation 
In addition to reducing allocative efficiency, regulation can also reduce dynamic efficiency — i.e., 
the ability of the economy to grow and innovate in the longer term — by reducing incentives to 
invest in research and development or, more generally incentives to produce innovative products. A 
typical example is that of inefficiently designed access policy in network industries, which causes 
a reduction of incentives to invest in infrastructure for the incumbent players, and sometimes 
a reduced incentive to invest in new infrastructure for new entrants, thus reducing dynamic 
efficiency in the market. 
2.1.2.8 Uncertainty and investment
A related negative impact that might emerge as a result of regulation is regulatory or legal 
uncertainty, which might affect expectations as regards return on investment, and as such limit 
the extent of investment in the economy. In this respect, too frequent changes in legislation can 
generate uncertainty among investors, thus either discouraging them altogether from investing in a 
given country/sector, or inducing them to postpone their investment to a later date.
2.1.3 Enforcement costs 
Legal rules have to be monitored and enforced to be effective. And, when controversies arise, 
courts have to solve them speedily and consistently for a rule to be reliable and effective. 
Depending on the type of rule and the regulatory option chosen, enforcement might be very cheap 
or very costly for public authorities. Consider the examples below:
• Speed limits enforced via street police require a lot of police officers on the road. The use 
of cameras and centralized control from police stations reduces the cost of enforcement 
by replacing the cost of street police with a one-off cost (camera installation) and the 
recurrent cost of maintenance, an increase in the cost of central police control and different 
administrative behaviour in treating fines and claims. 
14
• Abolishing businesses’ reporting obligations on health and safety measures does not remove 
the desirability of monitoring the safety and health in the workplace: this will most likely 
lead to enhanced monitoring and inspection costs on the side of public authorities. 
• Enabling citizens to report holes in city streets through a dedicated digital “app” reduces the 
cost of monitoring street by street and the corresponding labour costs. 
• Enabling rules that encourage private antitrust-damages actions also creates the potential for 
enhanced enforcement costs within the legal system. This means potentially more backlog 
in cases handled by courts and potential indirect costs (waiting time, reduction of legal 
certainty, loss of credibility of the court system, etc.). 
In summary, enforcement costs are an essential element to consider in any cost-benefit analysis, as 
their magnitude can tilt the balance in favour of regulatory options that would not be chosen in a 
more partial assessment. We divide enforcement costs in the following categories:
• One-off adaptation costs: this is typically the case in which a new legal rule forces 
administrations to retrain their personnel or change equipment (e.g., buy personal computers, 
cars, etc.)
• Information costs and administrative burdens. These are the costs of gathering and collecting 
information needed to effectively monitor compliance. When these activities entail the 
production of information to be delivered to third parties according to a legal provision, 
they are called “administrative burdens”; however, information costs can also be related 
to activities that are essential for carrying out enforcement actions, but do not entail any 
information obligation.
• Monitoring costs. The cost of monitoring compliance with the legislation, e.g., patrolling 
streets, collecting statistics, etc.
• Pure enforcement costs. These include the cost of running inspections, processing sanctions, 
and handling complaints by the enforcing authority.
• Adjudication/litigation costs. These are the costs of using the legal system, or an alternative 
dispute-resolution mechanism, to solve controversies generated by the new legal rule.
Enforcement costs are not only borne by public authorities: private actors face costs related to 
litigation when they need to use the legal system, as in the case of lawsuits: these are not strictly 
classified as administrative burdens, nor as compliance costs. They are costs that can be defined as 
the sum of the opportunity costs of the time spent dealing with litigation, plus the legal expenses 
that must be sustained (depending on the procedural rules that apply) in order to litigate a case as 
claimant or defendant. 
2.2 The benefits of regulation
As already explained above, available taxonomies of benefits are not as sophisticated as the ones 
developed for costs, probably since benefits are at once the most apparent aspect of a regulation 
(they are often stated as the reason for regulating) and the most difficult to classify, since they tend 
to be very specific to the regulation at hand. That said, just like costs, benefits can be classified as 
direct and indirect, meaning that they can affect the stakeholders targeted by the legislation or go 
beyond the target groups and affect other groups, or even become diffuse, societal benefits (e.g., 
increased safety). Apart from this, available guidance documents at the international level spend 
very little time discussing types of benefits and normally move directly to measurement techniques. 
As a result, in this section we will provide our own view of how the identification of benefits should 
be approached in carrying out an impact assessment. 
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More specifically, from a methodological viewpoint (and taking into account that there might be 
overlaps), direct benefits can be expressed in terms of:
• Additional utility, welfare or satisfaction for citizens — these are mostly valued through 
techniques aimed at capturing the sum of individual preferences for a future state of 
the world, whereas these preferences are often modelled through an approximation of 
individuals’ willingness to pay for such a state of the world.21 Such benefits include, most 
notably, health, safety and environmental benefits, which we treat separately in the following 
sections.22
• Improved market efficiency, which might include improvements in the allocation of 
resources, removal of regulatory or market failures, or cost savings generated by regulation. 
Within this category, cost savings can be approached following the taxonomy of costs 
introduced in the previous sections. For example, a given regulation might lead to a reduction 
of administrative burdens or compliance costs: in this case, the identification process and the 
related definition of (saved) costs follows the same criteria described in the previous sections 
dedicated to costs.
Indirect benefits include the following:
• Spillover effects related to third-party compliance with legal rules (so-called “indirect 
compliance benefits”). These include all those benefits that accrue to individuals or 
businesses that are not the addressees of the regulation, but enjoy positive effects due to the 
fact that others have to comply with the regulation. For example, the fact that mandatory 
safety standards are imposed (and enforced) on food producers might lead to important 
savings in monitoring costs by retailers. Also, the fact that more individuals comply with 
legislation mandating more healthy behaviour (e.g., no consumption of junk food) can 
lead to indirect benefits in the form of lower health-care costs for society over time. This 
category also includes benefits that are difficult to monetize, but are nevertheless important, 
such as enhanced legal certainty, positive externalities and spillover effects, deterrence and 
corrective justice. 
• Wider macroeconomic benefits such as GDP increase, competitiveness and productivity 
effects, etc. For example, although with a significant degree of approximation and some 
rather heroic assumptions, a 25 per cent reduction of administrative burdens has been 
estimated to trigger a GDP increase of up to 1.5 per cent in the Netherlands, one per cent in 
the U.K. and 1.4 per cent at the EU level. This second-order effect depends, in particular, 
on the assumption that reduced red tape would lead to the reallocation of freed resources to 
more productive uses, and as such incorporates the concept of opportunity cost. 
• Other non-monetizable benefits, such as the protection of fundamental rights, social 
cohesion, international and national stability, etc. 
2.2.1 Direct benefits: improved well-being
2.2.1.1 Benefits from “lifesaving regulation”
A specific category of benefits accruing from increased social welfare or individual utility, which 
has been extensively covered in the literature, includes those benefits that are related to the so-
21 
At this stage, we do not comment on the difference between GDP and happiness (to be discussed with the commission).
22 
A different, controversial issue is whether one could include in this group a category of benefits per se, which contribute 
to societal welfare regardless of whether stated or revealed preference techniques testify to the existence of demand for 
them. See C.R. Sunstein and R.H. Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2008).
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called “lifesaving regulation,” a term used mostly to indicate regulation that can create positive 
effects on human health and the environment.23 The usual caveat applies: since costs and benefits 
are two sides of the same coin, which we can term “impacts,” cases in which regulation can lead to 
a reduction of these benefits can be treated as cases of costs of regulation.
Benefits from lifesaving regulation include the following:
• Reduction of mortality: this is the case when regulation can reduce the number of fatalities, 
for example by imposing stricter safety requirements (e.g., seat belts when driving), or more 
generally increase life expectancy and reduce the risk of premature death. 
• Morbidity benefits. A morbidity benefit is the reduction in the risk of non-fatal health effects 
that can be characterized by duration and severity. This easily translates into improvements 
of the health of those living with diseases. This category also includes the reduction in 
tension or stress, and improvements in mental health.
• Environmental or ecological benefits: regulation can lead to several beneficial impacts on the 
environment, ranging from broad impacts (reduced pollution, preserving biodiversity) but 
including, most notably, very specific effects such as:
 ◦ Reduction of emissions of pollutants.
 ◦ Waste disposal and recycling.
 ◦ Soil protection.
 ◦ Noise reduction.
 ◦ Air quality.
 ◦ Water quality and availability. 
 ◦ Promotion of use of renewable resources
2.2.1.2 Direct benefits: improved market efficiency
A typical benefit of regulation is achieved whenever the latter contributes to addressing a factor 
due to which the interaction of market forces does not lead to an efficient outcome, a distortion that 
is often termed “market failure.” The underlying assumptions to this statement are: (i) that market 
forces, when they are not hampered by market failures, would achieve efficient outcomes; and (ii) 
that regulation can do something about it, i.e., that the cure for a market failure is not worse than 
the disease. 
The European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines already address the issue of market 
failures, which are summarized as follows:
• Externalities (positive or negative). Market prices do not reflect the real costs and benefits to 
society (“externalities”).
• Insufficient supply of public goods (such as clean air or safe streets).
• Missing or weak competition (including abuse of market or monopoly power).
• Missing or incomplete markets.
23 
For a more technical introduction to lifesaving regulation, see J. Graham, “Saving Lives through Administrative Law and 
Economics,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157 (2007): 395. The term “lifesaving” is understood to encompass 
rules that curtail risk of nonfatal injury and illness (morbidity) as well as the risk of premature death (mortality). This use of 
the terminology “lifesaving” is attributed to Richard Zeckhauser, “Procedures for Valuing Lives,” Public Policy 23 (1975): 
419; and Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shepard, “Where Now for Saving Lives?” Law and Contemporary Problems 
(Autumn 1976): 5. 
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• Information failures, such as imperfect information or lack of access to information for 
decision-takers (including consumers and public authorities), unless caused by a regulatory 
failure.
More specifically, economists normally define three different concepts of efficiency:
• Productive efficiency relates to the optimal use of resources in production processes, i.e., a 
more efficient outcome would be the possibility of producing the same quantity of output 
with less input. 
• Allocative efficiency refers to the allocation of resources to those economic actors that value 
them the most. This is typically a result achieved through perfect competition but can be 
challenged since in most cases it relies heavily on individuals’ willingness to pay, which is a 
rather controversial measurement technique when used to approximate individual preferences 
with regard to public goods and externalities. 
• Dynamic efficiency refers to incentives to invest and innovate, which might imply the 
availability of funds for R&D investment and an investment-friendly environment. 
The three concepts of efficiency are not always consistent and complementary. There has been a 
very long debate in economics regarding the market structure that is most conducive to allocative 
and dynamic efficiency, with many economists firmly believing that the latter can be achieved only 
at the expense of the former. 
2.2.2 Indirect benefits from third-party compliance with legal rules
Regulation and legislation can often produce spillover effects, which go beyond active compliance 
behaviour by the addressees of the regulation. Respect of the law can indeed create benefits for 
other stakeholders, especially if located along the same value chain. Just as regulation can produce 
indirect compliance costs, in some cases it can also produce indirect compliance benefits: for 
example, regulation that mandates safety standards for food producers can lead to cost savings for 
retailers; regulation that leads to productivity improvements in the workplace can lead to lower 
prices for downstream market players and end consumers; etc. 
In addition, third parties can also benefit from enhanced compliance with legal rules in other, less 
monetizable ways. This is the case when legislation discourages or deters criminal behaviour, 
thereby increasing safety — and more generally, every time legislation leads to the achievement of 
a public good. 
Finally, more widespread compliance with legal rules can also produce benefits to all those players 
that were already complying with rules before the enactment of a new policy: this occurs whenever 
more widespread compliance leads to a more level playing field between all market players, 
avoiding cases of free riding, or distorted competition.
2.2.2.1 Wider macroeconomic benefits
Macroeconomic benefits are an important area of benefits for impact assessment, especially in 
those cases in which regulations have cross-cutting effects across sectors, and as such require 
that the assessment goes beyond partial-equilibrium analysis and approaches general-equilibrium 
analysis. That said, two scenarios can emerge in an impact assessment:
• In most cases, macroeconomic benefits are to be considered as indirect benefits of legislation 
that aims at more specific, sectoral results. When this occurs, the best solution is to retain 
a partial-equilibrium analysis, and if proportionate and appropriate use “ready-made 
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multipliers” to assess how sectoral, specific benefits might translate into macroeconomic 
benefits.24
• In some cases, macroeconomic benefits can be the direct goal of given policy initiatives. This 
is the case for, among other things, impact assessments of government medium- to long-term 
sectoral or cross-sectoral strategies, for which the use of computational general equilibrium 
becomes appropriate and proportionate, as it allows for the simulation of long-term impacts 
on the economy. 
Macroeconomic impacts include impacts on GDP, productivity and growth, and financial and 
macro-economic stability. The relative weight of these elements of course will depend on the 
specific proposal that is subject to impact assessment.
3. EU BETTER REGULATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: A LOOK AT THE  
 CURRENT CONSULTATION
The financial sector, and in particular the banking and insurance sector, present important 
peculiarities when it comes to the EU better-regulation agenda. First, these sectors have gone 
through various waves of regulatory approaches over the past decade, which made them subject to 
rushed interventions due to the economic and financial crisis, which overlapped with co-regulatory 
interventions (e.g., in the cross-border payments system) and more general rules aimed at 
redesigning the governance of EU financial markets, including the recent legislation related to the 
creation of a banking union. All in all, the European Commission has completed 53 IAs in these 
sectors, first under the activities of DG Internal Market, and more recently DG FISMA (with the 
Juncker Commission). A full list of the IAs is available in Annex 1 of this report. 
FIGURE 2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION IAS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTORS, 2003–2015
 
Source: Author’s elaboration.
24 
The use of multipliers is, anyway, very controversial in the field of policy-impact assessment. If multipliers are used, the 
scientific evidence behind them has to be carefully scrutinized and quoted in the analysis.
19
Of the 53 IAs identified, the 36 carried out between 2003 and 2011 were scrutinized through a 
scorecard analysis (see Annex 3). The results suggest that IAs did not feature, on average, a very 
high degree of quantification of impacts, and that the comparison of alternatives took place in 
a rather unsystematic way. Also, the completeness of these documents does not seem to have 
improved significantly over the years, especially after 2008. 
3.1  The CMU and the new call for evidence on cumulative impacts of  
financial legislation
After several years, in which regulation in this sector was approached amid the emergency of the 
financial crisis, at end of September 2015 the European Commission decided to open up a public 
consultation on the EU regulatory framework for financial services, which remained open until 
the end of January 201625. Specifically, the commission was looking for empirical evidence and 
concrete feedback on:
• Rules affecting the ability of the economy to finance itself and grow. The rules in place to 
ensure financial stability and investor protection are essential for the functioning and the 
safety of the system and to restore investors' trust in financial services. At the same time, 
building on the 2014 communication on long-term financing and the Action Plan on Building 
a Capital Markets Union, it is important to ensure that the balance is right and that rules do 
not unduly discourage long-term investment and sustainable economic growth.
• Unnecessary regulatory burdens. There may be areas of EU legislation that impose burdens 
not commensurate with the intended policy objectives, for example, without proportionate 
associated material benefits in terms of making the system safer, or where they create 
unintended consequences. Burdens may also arise due to excessive complexity or duplicative 
reporting requirements. Some rules may also have become outdated due to technological 
change.
• Interactions, inconsistencies and gaps. EU financial rules were passed at different points over 
the past six years as a series of important individual measures, based on thorough impact 
assessments. Some rules may, taken together, give rise to unintended consequences. This 
may be due to, for example, duplications, inconsistencies, regulatory gaps and/or loopholes 
and/or lack of proper enforcement at the national level.
• Rules giving rise to unintended consequences. Rules to discourage excessive risk-taking or 
to de-risk the financial system may give rise to unintended consequences such as regulatory 
arbitrage or increasing pro-cyclicality. 
The Commission received 288 responses to the Call for Evidence. Respondents were based in 25 
different countries, including 5 non-EU countries. Of the 15 pre-defined topics for consultation, 
most replies related to unnecessary regulatory constraints on financing (issue 1), proportionality 
(issue 4), excessive compliance costs and complexity (issue 5), reporting and disclosure obligations 
(issue 6) and overlaps, duplications and inconsistencies (issue 12). The Commission expected that 
the outcome of this consultation would provide a clearer understanding of the interaction of the 
individual rules and cumulative impacts of the legislation as a whole, including potential overlaps, 
inconsistencies and gaps. The consultation should also have helped inform the individual reviews 
and provide a basis for concrete and coherent action where required. However, while respondents 
provided a number of examples and descriptions of where the rules are perceived to be inconsistent, 
overlapping or duplicative (e.g. reporting and disclosure requirements, definitions), limited specific 
information was provided as regards the compliance costs or the wider market impacts of these 
inconsistencies or overlaps. Similarly, the Commission observed that “feedback on the market 
25 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/financial-regulatory-framework-review/index_en.htm.
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impacts of the different rules (e.g. their impact on funding or market liquidity or other unintended 
consequences) was largely qualitative or based on external studies. This may reflect the difficulty of 
assessing the impact of rules that are very recent (or not yet implemented or adopted). It may also 
reflect the difficulties inherent in isolating the impact of EU rules from other factors (e.g. monetary 
policy, national policy changes, macroeconomic developments) that may also play a significant role”.
On 25 April 2016, the Commission took stock of the progress made in the first six months since 
the adoption of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan and published the first CMU status report. 
The commission explained that alternative sources of finance, complementary to bank financing — 
including capital markets, venture capital, crowdfunding and the asset management industry — are 
more widely used in other parts of the world, and should play a bigger role in providing financing 
to companies that struggle to get funding, especially SMEs and startups. Having more diversified 
sources of financing is good for investment and business but is also essential to financial stability, 
mitigating the impact of potential problems in the banking sector on companies and their access 
to finance. For this reason, CMU is also an important part of the work on the completion of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union. The commission also wants to break down barriers that 
are blocking cross-border investments in the EU to make it easier for companies and infrastructure 
projects to get the financing they need, regardless of where they are located. 
The European Council of 28 June 2016 called for swift and determined progress to ensure easier 
access to finance for businesses and to support investment in the real economy by moving forward 
with the CMU agenda.As a result, on 30 September 2016 the European Commission adopted a 
Communication on “Capital Markets Union – Accelerating Reform”, which marks a commitment 
towards the finalization of the first CMU measures (securitisation package, modernisation of the 
Prospectus rules, strengthening venture capital markets and social investments, supporting the 
development of national and regional capital markets in the Member States); to then move to other 
key CMU actions, including a proposal on business restructuring and insolvency; encouraging 
Member States to remove withholding tax barriers and encouraging best tax practices in promoting 
venture capital, such as increasing equity financing over debt, and amending insurance and 
banking legislation to further unlock private investment in infrastructure and SMEs. Finally, the 
Commission announced that it will also look at new priorities, such as supporting the development 
of personal pensions markets and other retail financial services; and developing a comprehensive 
European strategy on sustainable finance26.
3.2 Example: the impact assessment on securitization: a synthesis
Securitization is the process where a financial instrument is created, typically by a lender such 
as a bank, by pooling assets (for example car loans or SME loans) for investors to purchase. 
This facilitates access to a greater range of investors, thereby increasing liquidity and freeing up 
capital from the banks for new lending. The commission is proposing a regulatory framework for 
securitization that is simple, transparent and standardized and subject to adequate supervisory 
control. According to the commission’s estimates, if EU securitization issuance was built up again 
to the pre-crisis average, it would generate between 100 and 150 billion euros in additional funding 
for the economy.
26 
See COM (2016) 601 Final, 30 Sptember 2016, at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/20160914-
com-2016-601_en.pdf.
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3.2.1 What is the problem?
Before the crisis the securitization market was a growing channel of funding to the European 
economy. This market performed well during the crisis, generating negligible losses. However, its 
post-crisis reputation was severely tarnished by practices and events taking place elsewhere, mainly 
in the U.S. This stigma is reflected in investors’ perception of the riskiness of EU securitization 
as well as in securitization’s regulatory treatment, which has been calibrated mainly on losses in 
U.S. markets. Since EU securitization losses have been a fraction of those in the U.S., they are 
disadvantaged by a regulatory treatment designed for their riskier counterparts. As a consequence 
of the stigma and the regulatory treatment, the EU securitization market is now stalled. A financing 
channel for the EU economy is thus lost. In the European context, where 80 per cent of financial 
intermediation takes place through banks, the implications for growth are substantial. The 
creditless recovery is protracted, slowing growth and job creation.
Emerging problems include:
• Low demand for securitization products. 
• High operational costs for investor and issuers. 
Without securitization, the ability of banks to reduce their balance sheet by selling assets is indeed 
constrained. As a consequence, the current need for deleveraging compels banks to shrink their 
balance sheets by reducing credit provisions. From a long-term perspective, the moribund state of 
the securitization market deprives the EU economy of a capital market that could provide additional 
funding when the banking channel cannot because of its own dynamics. 
These dynamics are less relevant in the U.S. where securitization issues have started growing again 
after a substantial drop in 2008. In 2014, issues in the U.S. were still less than half that in 2007 
but a positive trend is clearly visible. This is however mostly ascribable to public guarantees from 
state agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae), which cover the vast majority of the 
market. Such guarantees are however not feasible in Europe where an EU-level shared guarantee 
fund many times the size of currently existing supranational guarantors would be needed. It would 
also not be advisable as such schemes transfer risk from mortgage markets to the public sector, as 
recently highlighted by the IMF.27 
27 
See IMF (2014), "Euro Areas Policies: Selected Issues", IMF Country Report No. 14/199. At http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14199.pdf.
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FIGURE 3 SECURITIZATION, A VISUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSES, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES
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3.3) Consequences 
 
Before the crisis the securitisation market was a growing channel of alternative funding to banks 
and the European economy. In addition its loss performance during the crisis showed good 
resilience. As a consequence of the problems highlighted in this chapter, as well as the subdued 
macroeconomic environment described in the introduction, this market is now moribund. A 
financing channel for the EU economy is impaired, with substantial detriment to potential 
contribution to growth and employment. Without securitisation, banks' ability to reduce their 
balance sheet by selling assets is indeed constrained. As a consequence, the current need for 
deleveraging imposes banks to shrink their balance sheets by reducing credit provision. In the 
European context, where 80% of financial intermediation takes place through banks, the 
implications for growth are relevant.  
From a long term perspective, the moribund state of the securitisation market deprives the EU 
economy of a capital market that could provide additional funding when the banking channel cannot 
because of its own dynamics.  
These dynamics are less relevant in the US where issuance has restarted growing after a substantial 
drop in 2008.  US 2014 issuance was still less than half than in 2007 but a positive trend is clearly 
visible. This is however mostly ascribable to public guarantees from state agencies (Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae), which cover the vast majority of the market. Such guarantees are 
however not feasible in Europe where an EU-level shared guarantee fund many times the size of 
currently existing supranational guarantors would be needed. It would also not be advisable as such 
schemes transfer risk from mortgage markets to the public sector, as recently highlighted by the 
IMF (see IMF 2014). 
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3.2.2 What is the objective of the proposal?
In light of the analysis of the problems above, the general objective is to revive a safer securitization 
market that will improve the financing of the EU economy, weakening the link between banks’ 
deleveraging needs and credit tightening in the short run, and creating a more balanced and stable 
funding structure for the EU economy in the long run. This should in turn benefit end users of 
credit intermediation: households, SMEs and larger corporations. 
Reaching these general objectives requires the achievement of the following, more specific policy 
objectives: 
• Remove stigma from investors and regulatory disadvantages for simple and transparent 
securitization products.
• Reduce/eliminate unduly high operational costs for issuers and investors. 
These in turn require the attainment of the following operational objectives: 
• Differentiate simple, transparent and standardized securitization (“STS”) products from more 
opaque and complex ones. This objective will be measured against the difference in price of 
STS versus non-STS products. If this objective is achieved, this difference should increase. 
This should also trigger an increase in the supply of STS products, the reason being that 
the achievement of this objective will also be measured by the growth in issuance of STS 
products versus non-STS ones. 
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• Support the standardization of processes and practices in securitization markets and tackle 
regulatory inconsistencies. This objective will be measured against: 1) STS products’ price 
and issuance; 2) The degree of standardization of marketing and reporting material; and 3) 
feedback from market practitioners on the evolution of operational costs. 
3.2.3 What options were considered?
As shown in Figure 5 below, a range of options have been considered to introduce STS criteria: 
to adapt the regulatory framework to reflect the different risk profile of STS products and to 
standardize the building blocks of the securitization legislation (i.e., definitions, disclosure and 
due diligence requirements). In each field a no-action option, a non-legislative action option, and 
a legislative action option have been considered. The preferred option is a legislative action that 
would introduce STS criteria, introduce a differentiated regulatory framework for STS products 
and standardize the building blocks of the securitization legislation (i.e., definitions, disclosure 
and due diligence requirements). This option should achieve differentiation and render the 
regulatory treatment more risk-sensitive than it currently is. Furthermore, it should standardize 
currently heterogeneous provisions in EU legislation on securitization definition, disclosure and 
due diligence requirements. All this should in turn fight stigma and foster the revival of a safe and 
sustainable securitization market.
TABLE 1 OPTIONS CONSIDERED PER SPECIFIC PROBLEM
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5) POLICY OPTIONS 
 
In order to meet the first operational objective, this impact assessment analyses 14 different policy 
options. For ease of reference, these options have been grouped into different headings, such as 
options on product differentia ion, scope of the differentiation, compliance mechanism and the 
prudential treatment (see table below).  
 
  Option Description 
Simple Transparent and Standardised criteria 
1.1 
No action on 
differentiation 
Take no further action at EU level to introduce STS criteria 
1.2 
Soft law by EU Codes of conduct, guidelines or recommendations to encourage 
Member States to set up specific provisions for STS products 
and/or endorsement or support to private initiatives 
1.3 
EU legislative initiative 
to specify STS criteria 
Introduction of a legal instrument specifying a set of criteria for 
STS securitisation products 
Scope of differentiation 
2.1 
Same scope as LCR and 
S2 
The scope of STS securitisations would only cover 'term' 
securitisation (ABS with medium to long term maturity) 
2.2 
2.1 + ABCP Additional criteria for identifying STS types of short term 
securitisations 
2.3 
2.2 + synthetics Introduce criteria for both ABCP and synthetic securitisations 
Compliance mechanism 
3.1 
Introduce a self-
attestation mechanism 
Responsibility for compliance with the criteria will lie with the 
originator of the securitisation 
3.2 
3.1 + 3rd party 
assessment 
Self-attestation by the originator complemented by assessment  
provided by an independent third-party 
3.3 
3.1 + ex-ante supervisory 
approval 
Self-attestation by the originator complemented by ex-ante 
supervisory approval.  
Prudential treatment 
Banking prudential treatment 
4.1 
No change to the 
existing securitisation 
framework  
All securitisations (both STS and non-STS) continue to be subject 
to the same prudential treatment set out in CRR 
4.2 
Develop a preferential 
capital treatment for STS 
securitisations  
Amend the existing requirements in the CRR with a new 
framework that would differentiate between STS and non-STS 
securitisations with a preferential treatment for the former 
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Insurance prudential treatment 
4.3 
No further action on 
Insurance prudential 
treatment 
Solvency 2 standard formula for capital charges unchanged 
4.4 
Modify treatment for 
senior tranches of STS 
products 
Refine existing approach - without changing the scope of the 
differentiated approach (i.e. improve the risk-sensitivity of the 
calibrations for senior tranches only). 
4.5 
Modify treatment for all 
tranches of STS products 
Extend the differentiated approach to insurers' investments in non-
senior tranches of STS securitisation deals and refine the existing 
approach   
 
In order to meet the second operational objective, a total of three different policy options has been 
analysed in this impact assessment (see table below). Notice that, while options aiming at the 
achievement of the first objective refer to the regulation of STS products, options aiming at the 
achievement of the second objective aim at setting the optimal provisions that will apply onto all 
securitisation products, STS and non-STS alike. 
 
B)   Options aiming at fostering the standardisation of processes and practises and tackling 
regulatory inconsistencies 
5.1 No further action at EU level Finalise implementation of  agreed reforms and address some 
remaining issues 
5.2 Establish a single EU 
securitisation framework and 
encourage market participants 
to develop standardisation 
Establish a single EU securitisation legislative framework 
defining securitisation, transparency, disclosure, due diligence 
and risk retention rules. 
5.3 Adopt a comprehensive EU 
securitisation framework 
Complementing option 5.2 with an EU securitisation 
framework harmonising Member States' legal frameworks for 
securitisation vehicles 
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3.2.4 What are the benefits of the preferred option? 
Based on mostly qualitative analysis, the Eur pean C mmission conclud s that the first objective 
(to differentiate simple, transparent and standardized securitization products from more opaque 
and complex ones) is best fulfilled by a combination of options 1.3, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2 and 4.5. These 
are therefore the retained options. These options together should introduce an immediately 
recognizable STS product in EU securitization markets. Backed by an efficient compliance 
mechanism, STS products will be trusted by investors and can thus provide the legal basis for an 
amended capital treatment. This will indeed reflect more closely the risk profile of STS products, 
thereby allowing investors and issuers to reap the benefits of simple, transparent and standardized 
structures. The most effective and efficient policy option to achieve the second objective (to 
foster the spread of standardization of processes and practices in securitization markets and 
tackle regulatory inconsistencies) is option 5.2, which is therefore retained. Establishing a single 
and consistent EU securitization framework and encouraging market participants to develop 
further standardization will increase legal clarity for originators and investors and reduce 
current regulatory inconsistencies. This will in turn positively impact investors’ and originators’ 
administrative burden. 
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To the extent that the proposed policies will create a new channel of financing for the EU economy, 
one that is less dependent on banking sector constraints, they will reduce the effect of financial 
crises on credit provision and thus on growth and employment. The social costs of such crises will 
be reduced. Furthermore, by fostering the spread of securitization structures whose risks can be 
analyzed, understood and priced, the policy options will foster a securitization market conductive 
to better funding of the economy in a context of financial stability. Nothing would suggest that the 
proposed policy will have any direct or indirect impacts on environmental issues.
3.2.5 What are the costs of the preferred option?
Beyond the costs for market participants and public authorities to adapt to the new regulatory 
framework, there should be no relevant social and economic cost. Nothing would suggest that the 
proposed policy will have any direct or indirect impacts on environmental issues. 
3.2.6 How will businesses, SMEs and micro-enterprises be affected?
The policy options chosen should have several positive effects on SME financing. First, the 
inclusion of short-term securitizations such as ABCP in the STS framework, with consequential 
improvement in their capital treatment, should foster the growth of this important source of SME 
financing. Secondly, the initiative should provide banks with a tool for transferring risk out of their 
balance sheets. As a consequence, freed capital should be increasingly used by banks to provide 
new credit to families and firms, most of which are SMEs in the EU. Finally, by introducing a 
single and consistent EU securitization framework and encouraging market participants to develop 
further standardization, the initiative should reduce operational costs for securitizations. Since 
these costs are higher than average for the securitization of SME loans, the fall should have an 
especially beneficial effect on the cost of credit to SMEs.
3.2.7 Consultation and the RSB opinion
It is important to note the following, excerpted from the EU’s consultation report:
• A public consultation on a possible EU framework for simple, transparent and standardised 
securitisation was carried out between 18 February and 13 May 2015. 121 replies were 
received. On the whole, the consultation indicated that the priority should be to develop an 
EU-wide framework for simple, transparent and standardized securitization. Respondents 
generally agreed that the much stronger performance of EU securitizations during the crisis 
compared to U.S. ones needs to be recognized and that the current regulatory framework, 
needs modification. This would help the recovery of the European securitization market in 
a sustainable way providing an additional channel of financing for the EU economy while 
ensuring financial stability.
• The Commission has gained valuable insights through its participation in the discussions and 
exchange of views informing the BCBS-IOSCO joint task force on securitisation markets. The 
Commission has also attentively followed the work relating to key aspects of securitisation 
carried out by the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) as well 
as by its members separately (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA). Three public consultations, carried out 
in 2014 by ECB-Bank of England (BoE), Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
- International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and EBA respectively, have 
gathered valuable information on stakeholders’ views on securitisation markets. In its own 
consultation, the commission has built on these, focusing on gathering further details on key 
issues. Fruitful meetings and exchange of ideas with European central banks and the IMF 
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have enriched the debate and understanding of the issues. On the whole, these international 
level consultations confirm the views expressed in the commission’s own consultation, and 
provide some additional feedback on the relative merits of some of the proposed policy 
options.
• An impact assessment steering group was set up to ensure consistency across services. 
The first meeting of the impact assessment steering group took place on 10 April 2015. The 
second meeting took place on 19 May 2015 and the third one on 8 June 2015. Directorate 
generals involved in the steering group were ECFIN, GROW, SG, LS, JUST and COMP. The 
meeting of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) took place on 15 July 2015. 
• The RSB gave a positive opinion and recommended the following changes: 
 ◦ The report should go beyond the EU level to also explain the situation in the member 
states. In particular, it should provide an overview of the situation of loan and 
securitisation markets across member states and their likely evolution in the absence of 
EU intervention. Moreover, it should show the differentiated impact of the policy options 
in member states.
 ◦ The report should clearly link the objectives of the initiative with the identified problems. 
To this end, the report should describe the larger macroeconomic context and indicate 
the relative importance of a revival of the securitization market as one of the instruments 
to improve the situation of the banking sector, increase the provision of bank credit and 
prop-up economic activity.
 ◦ The analysis of the impacts should provide a balanced overview of the pros and cons 
of each policy option and discuss possible risks that may prevent the attainment of the 
objectives. It should also describe existing and future risk mitigation instruments.
3.3  The European System of Financial Supervision and evolving impact 
assessment practices
From its onset in 2007, the global financial crisis revealed both gaps in the legislation that governs 
the financial system and shortcomings in the practice of financial supervision. In the European 
Union (EU), the crisis additionally highlighted deficiencies in the structures for cross-border crisis 
resolution; it shed light on the inconsistent application of the EU’s legal framework for financial 
services and it tested supervisory co-operation and co-ordination between member states, in 
some cases affecting the trust between national supervisors. In order to address these issues and 
to achieve a more effective system of supervision, a new architecture for European financial 
supervision was developed based on the recommendations of the 2009 de Larosière report. This 
new arrangement, the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), was adopted in the form 
of regulations agreed by the European Parliament and the Council in late 2010 establishing: 
• The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), responsible for the macro-prudential oversight 
of the financial system, focusing on systemic risk;
• Three European supervisory authorities (ESAs) responsible for micro-prudential supervision 
of financial markets and activities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and 
Market Authority (ESMA);
• The Joint Committee to foster co-ordination amongst the three authorities; and with 
participation of national competent authorities (NCAs) in the three financial sectors.
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FIGURE 4 ARCHITECTURE OF THE ESFS
 
The objective of the ESAs according to Article 1(5) EBA and ESMA Regulations (Article 1(6) 
EIOPA Regulation) is to “protect the public interest by contributing to the short, medium and 
long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the EU economy, its citizens and 
businesses.” Furthermore, this article specifies that the ESAs should contribute to:
• Improving the functioning of the internal market, including in particular a sound, effective 
and consistent level of regulation and supervision;
• Ensuring the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets;
• Strengthening international supervisory co-ordination;
• Preventing regulatory arbitrage and promoting equal conditions of competition;
• Ensuring the taking of related risks are appropriately regulated and supervised; and
• Enhancing customer protection.
The ESAs address these objectives through regulatory, supervisory, financial-stability and 
consumer-protection roles within the ESFS. 
For matter concerning impact assessment, the role of the ESAs is primarily that of responding to 
specific requests for technical advice sent by the European Commission. However, according to 
the ESAs’ regulation, ESAs have to carry out cost-benefit analysis when drafting implementing 
technical standards, and submit it for public consultation. Pursuant to this disposition, ESAs have 
conducted impact assessment and included both the draft standards and the whole IA process in the 
consultation paper, so that they can be evaluated and commented on by the stakeholders. Moreover, 
through its formal and informal consultation procedures, CBA/IA makes regulatory policy more 
transparent and thus can help to make the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) — EBA, 
EIOPA, and ESMA — more accountable. It is also a means of communication between the ESAs, 
the different national regulators involved, the regulated firms and other affected or interested 
parties. The three ESAs have produced common cost-benefit/impact-assessment guidelines to 
help achieve this, although the guidelines are not yet public (the current version dates back to the 
“Lamfalussy era,” in 2008).28
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“Impact Assessment Guidelines for EU Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees” (Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 
2008), https://eiopa.europa.eu/CEIOPS-Archive/Documents/Guidelines/3L3IAGUIDELINES.pdf.
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Recent examples of impact assessments are:
• ESMA’s technical advice on the evaluation of the Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, 
available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-614_final_report_on_ssr_
evaluation.pdf. 
• ESMA’s consultation paper on MiFID II/MiFIR, published in 2014, and available at http://
www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2014-549_-_consultation_paper_mifid_ii_-_mifir.pdf.
• ESMA’s impact assessment, which forms Annex III to the final report on draft technical 
standards under the Regulation No. 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of July 23, 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central 
securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation 
(EU) No. 236/2012. Available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2015-esma-1457_-_
annex_iii_-_cba_csdr_ts_on_csd_requirements_and_internalised_settlement.pdf. 
• ESMA’s call for evidence on the Impact of the Best Practice Principles for Providers of 
Shareholder Voting Research and Analysis, available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/
files/2015-920.pdf. 
• ESMA’s consultation paper on draft guidelines for the assessment of knowledge and 
competence on MIFID II, at https://www.esma.europa.eu/content/Draft-guidelines-
assessment-knowledge-and-competence.
• EIOPA’s Revised Impact Assessment on the EIOPA Solvency II Guidelines, available at 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Consultations/EIOPA_EIOPA-BoS-15-039_Impact_
Assessment_GL%20_set_1.pdf#search=impact%20assessment. 
In the case of the EBA, reports tend to be closer to ex post evaluations of specific market risks. 
Also the European Systemic Risk Board occasionally performs impact assessments. One example 
is the March 2015 ESRB report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures, which contains 
a simplified impact assessment.29 During the review of the functioning of the ESA in 2014, the 
European Commission reported concerns expressed by stakeholders, which pointed to the lack 
of detailed feedback on the consultations and the frequently perceived lack of high-quality cost-
benefit analysis performed by ESAs.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA
The EU Better Lawmaking agenda is deeply rooted in treaty provisions, which stress the need for 
EU institutions to adopt their policy initiatives in a way that is open, transparent, accountable, and 
in full respect of fundamental rights and key principles such as subsidiarity and proportionality. The 
way in which the agenda has been implemented goes very far in ensuring respect for these principles, 
and indeed many aspects of the EU policy process can be considered as best practices worldwide. 
This certainly applies to the pervasiveness of the consultation process and standards, as well as to 
the ever-growing use of ex ante impact assessments, monitoring and ex post evaluations throughout 
the policy cycle. The new better-regulation package adopted by the European Commission on May 
19, 2015 further strengthens these prerogatives of the EU policy process and must be welcome in 
general terms for this reason. The same applies to the commission’s proposed new Inter-Institutional 
Agreement on Better Regulation, with the caveats that will be illustrated below.
29 
“ESRB report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures” (European Systemic Risk Board, March 
2015), https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/esrbreportregulatorytreatmentsovereignexposures032015.
en.pdf?82a33cdeb5f7ff35e07e7e7b8e548822.
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Against this backdrop, there are still some gaps in the existing policy cycle at the EU level, and also 
some reasons to be concerned about the feasibility of some of the proposed reforms. 
The gaps that are most evident in the current EU better-lawmaking agenda can be summarized as 
follows:
• There is no full certainty nor full accountability on the part of the commission for what 
concerns the selection of “major” proposals that should undergo inception IAs, full 
impact assessments and now also consultation and impact assessments on delegated and 
implementing acts. The commission has always stated that, as a general rule, all legislative 
and non-legislative initiatives included in the commission’s annual work program will be 
subject to ex ante IA, but has also been equally accurate in stating that this general rule can 
very well find exceptions, as some initiatives not included in the work program could be 
subject to IA, and some that are included might eventually be exempted. 
• As a reflection of this lack of full accountability, there is no judicial scrutiny over the 
obligation to respect fundamental better-regulation principles throughout the process. While 
in other jurisdictions (e.g., the United States) a piece of regulation can be declared null and 
void by a federal court for material or procedural errors in carrying out the underlying cost-
benefit analysis, European courts have no such gatekeeping role. 
• There are also uncertainties related to methodology. To the extent that the pendulum keeps 
swinging between cost-benefit analysis and multi-criteria analysis inside the European 
Commission, the importance attached to issues such as respect for fundamental rights or 
distributional impacts will continue to be surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. 
• There is also a problem of overall scope and coherence between the EU better-lawmaking 
agenda and the medium- to long-term goals of the European Union. The methodological 
uncertainty highlighted above is also relevant for what concerns the link between the tools 
used by the commission in appraising its own proposals and the ultimate targets and goals 
politically set in initiatives such as Europe 2020. It is, indeed, a different thing to speak of an 
IA system that looks at the “efficiency” of proposals (through cost-benefit analysis), and an 
IA system aimed at checking the consistency of proposed actions with the union’s politically 
set targets in terms of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. A move towards the latter 
approach would probably make it a lot easier to implement better-regulation principles in the 
European Parliament and the Council, since these institutions would feel more ownership 
of impact assessment if they could depart from a mere technical document that looks at the 
efficiency of proposals, possibly ignoring other important aspects such as distributional 
impacts, fairness, innovation, poverty, employment, etc. 
• As already mentioned, important gaps are found in the way the Council of the EU handles 
legislative proposals: the compatibility of Council amendments with the interests of the 
EU citizens and the EU project as a whole is not subject to any assessment, nor is there any 
specific motivation for proposals that in some cases can easily be seen as worsening the 
original balance struck by commission and parliamentary decisions. 
• Finally, the role of member states in the process should be strengthened. Better regulation 
cannot be made meaningful if the transposition, implementation and enforcement phases of 
EU rules are not subject to clear ex ante appraisal, monitoring and evaluation. Initiatives such 
as extended guidance on implementation (e.g., in the U.K.), a constant interaction between 
the national parliament and the EU authorities (e.g., in the Swedish parliament) and ex ante 
assessments of impacts of pending dossiers on national interests (as the ones Germany’s 
Normenkontrollrat is now starting to produce) are so far too sparse to be considered as the 
rule, and are rather exceptions that would deserve more diffusion in member states.
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As regards the concerns that current proposals raise, these include the following:
• A first element of concern, and a missing explanation, is how the European Commission 
plans to multiply its activities, providing for many more rounds of consultation, inception 
IAs, implementation plans and much more without significantly increasing the staff 
dedicated to these tasks. And even if more staff is allocated to these tasks, it is unclear how 
the right competencies can be put in the right place. Maybe this can be seen as a medium-
term commitment. The suspicion here is that such an enhanced workload (and the expected 
lengthier duration of the policy process) would only be sustainable if the commission 
maintained its initial approach, which seems oriented to a drastic reduction in the number of 
proposals tabled on a yearly basis.
• Even if the commission very cautiously repeats in several occasions that it plans to look at 
social and environmental impacts, very often there seems to be an almost exclusive reference 
to administrative burdens and regulatory costs. To what extent this will remain the dominant 
refrain in the commission’s better-regulation actions remains to be seen.
• The restatement of the joint responsibility of all three institutions to ensure that adequate 
information is provided on the prospective impacts of final piece of legislation hides the lack 
of a real attribution of responsibility to the Parliament and most importantly to the Council, 
the most reluctant of all EU institutions when it comes to evidence-based decision-making. 
It would be easy for a malicious commentator to observe that such a shared commitment was 
already emphatically stated in the 2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, 
and yet very little has happened since then.
• What about self-regulation and co-regulation? Perhaps the most surprising “elephant in 
the room” in looking at the new proposed inter-institutional agreement is the total absence 
of any reference to the issue of self- and co-regulation, which were prominent in the 2003 
agreement. This comes after the European Economic and Social Committee filed a rather 
detailed and sophisticated opinion on the issue, seeking to clarify the features that a self- or 
a co-regulatory scheme should display in order to be considered as potentially in line with 
the public interest. So far, the impact-assessment guidelines simply refer to the “principles 
for better self- and co-regulation” developed in the past years with respect to the advertising 
sector by DG SANCO, and recently made the subject of a community of practice co-
ordinated by DG CONNECT. What will happen to self- and co-regulation in the European 
Union? This is a delicate issue, since in many sectors of the economy the growing pace 
of innovation and technological development call for the adoption of flexible regulatory 
regimes: but absent more clarity on this issue, stakeholders might be discouraged from 
engaging with the commission in otherwise welfare-enhancing forms of public-private co-
operation in the design and enforcement of regulation.
Concerning the comparison of the EU with Canada, it is clear that suggesting that Canada adopt 
the EU better-regulation system would be far from appropriate, as evidence suggests that Canada 
can rely on a rather robust set of tools and procedures, both for regulatory impact assessment and 
for stakeholder consultation. In the financial sector, the use of sunset clauses (for example, the 
mandatory revision of the Bank Act every five years) ensures a rather complete policy cycle, and 
seems to be at least as advanced as the corresponding EU model. However, Canada can look at 
some specific practices being experimented with in the EU, which could become useful suggestions 
for further strengthening of the Canadian better-regulation system.
Recommendation #1 — assess cumulative effects of legislation. It is fair to state that the EU 
has put more emphasis than Canada has on the policy cycle. While ex post evaluation, REFIT 
and cumulative cost assessment is becoming the rule in Europe, the role of ex post evaluation 
in Canada appears weaker. In particular, the assessment of the cumulative effects of legislation 
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appears as a much-needed initiative, especially in the financial sector, where the consistency and 
overall effectiveness of the overall corpus of legislation should be appraised, in addition to the 
overall fitness for purpose of individual pieces of legislation.
Recommendation #2 — adopt a methodological framework for impact assessment. The analysis 
of the prospective impacts of new regulation in Canada would benefit from the adoption of a 
general framework for the identification and assessment of direct and indirect impacts, as well 
as emerging risks and ways to manage/mitigate them. The taxonomy of costs and benefits of 
regulation illustrated above can provide a starting point for the elaboration of a more systematic, 
comprehensive framework for all agencies in charge of impact assessment and ex post evaluation in 
Canada.
Recommendation #3 — consider strengthening policy appraisal at the primary legislation 
level. Canada seems very well equipped to scrutinize secondary legislation, but much less geared 
towards a thorough assessment of the prospective impacts of primary legislative proposals. 
Systematic appraisal in the Canadian Parliament, for example, would likely improve the overall 
governance of the better-regulation system in Canada. In line with recent suggestions by the 
OECD, parliamentary scrutiny of legislative proposals, both ex ante and ex post, could help Canada 
guarantee better regulation at all levels of government.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ABCP  Asset-backed commercial paper
ABS   Asset-based securitization
BAU  Business as usual 
CBA  Cost-benefit analysis
CMU  Capital Markets Union
CRR  Capital Requirements Regulation
EBA  European Banking Authority
EIOPA  European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
ESAs  European Supervisory Authorities
ESFS  European System of Financial Supervision
ESMA  European Securities and Markets Authority
IA   Impact assessment
IAB  Impact Assessment Board
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOSCO   International Organisation of Securities Commissions
NCA  National Competent Authority
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
REFIT  Regulatory fitness
R&D  Research and development
RIA  Regulatory impact analysis
RSB  Regulatory Scrutiny Board
SME  Small and medium-sized enterprises
STS  Simple, transparent and standardized (securitization)
SWD   Staff working document
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ANNEX 1: EUROPEAN COMMISSION IAS IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
Date Title IA ref. Proposal Ref IAB/RSB opinion ref.
4/21/04 Directive on reinsurance SEC(2004)443pdf(328 kB) COM(2004)273  
7/14/04 Capital adequacy Directive SEC(2004)921pdf(324 kB)  COM(2004)486   
12/1/05 Legal Framework of Payments SEC(2005)1535pdf(848 kB) COM(2005)603  
9/12/06 Supervisory approval for major shareholdings in 
banking, insurance, securities
SEC(2006)1117pdf(110 
kB) +SEC(2006)1118pdf(513 kB)
COM(2006)507  
11/15/06 White paper on enhancing the Single Market 
framework for investment funds
SEC(2006)1451pdf(754 
kB) +SEC(2006)1452pdf(138 kB)
COM(2006)686  
7/10/07 Taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance 
and Reinsurance - Solvency II
SEC(2007)871pdf(989 kB) COM(2007)361 SEC(2007)872pdf(128 kB)
12/18/07 White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage 
Credit Markets
SEC(2007)1683pdf(2 
MB) +SEC(2007)1684pdf(164 kB)
COM(2007)807 SEC(2007)1685pdf(183 
kB)
4/23/08 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 98/26/
EC on settlement finality in payment and securities 
settlement systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on 
financial collateral arrangements as regards linked 
systems and credit claims
SEC(2008)491pdf(455 
kB) +SEC(2008)492
COM(2008)213 Final IAB Opinionpdf(120 
kB)
7/16/08 Proposal for a Directive on the co-ordination of 
laws regulations, and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities (UCITS)
SEC(2008)2263pdf(894 
kB) +SEC(2008)2264
COM(2008)458 SEC(2008)2265pdf(196 
kB)
10/1/08 Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks 
affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds 
items large exposures, supervisory arrangements 
and crisis management
SEC(2008)2532pdf(2 
MB) +SEC(2008)2533pdf(41 kB)
COM(2008)602 SEC(2008)2534pdf(176 
kB)
10/9/08 Proposal for a Directive on the taking up, pursuit 
and prudential supervision of the business of 
electronic money institutions, amending Directives 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing 
Directive 2000/46/EC
SEC(2008)2573pdf(497 
kB) +SEC(2008)2572
COM(2008)627 SEC(2008)2571pdf(29 kB)
10/13/08 Proposal for a Regulation on cross-border 
payments in the Community
SEC(2008)2598pdf(295 
kB) +SEC(2008)2599
COM(2008)640 SEC(2008)2600pdf(237 
kB)
11/12/08 Proposal for a Regulation on Credit Rating 
Agencies
SEC(2008)2745pdf(424 
kB) +SEC(2008)2746
COM(2008)704 SEC(2008)2747pdf(181 kB)
4/29/09 Communication - Packaged Retail Investment 
Products
SEC(2009)556 +SEC(2009)557 COM(2009)204 SEC(2009)558pdf(138 kB)
4/29/09 Proposal for a Directive on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers and amending Directives 2004/39/
EC and 2009/.../EC
SEC(2009)576 +SEC(2009)577 COM(2009)207 SEC(2009)578pdf
4/29/09 Commission Recommendation on remuneration 
policies in the financial services sector
SEC(2009)580pdf(395 
kB) +SEC(2009)581pdf(43 kB)
C(2009)3159pdf(47 kB) SEC(2009)582pdf(276 kB)
5/27/09 Communication on financial supervision in Europe SEC(2009)715 +SEC(2009)716 COM(2009)252 SEC(2009)717pdf(261 kB)
7/13/09 Directive amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for 
the trading book and for re-securitizations, and the 
supervisory review of remuneration policies
SEC(2009)974 +SEC(2009)975 COM(2009)362 Final IAB Opinionpdf(251 
kB)
9/23/09 Proposal for a Directive amending directives 
2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published 
when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the 
harmonization of transparency requirements 
in relation to information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market
SEC(2009)1223 +SEC(2009)1222 COM(2009)491 SEC(2009)1221pdf(219 kB)
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Date Title IA ref. Proposal Ref IAB/RSB opinion ref.
10/20/09 Communication — An EU framework for cross-
border crisis management in the banking sector
SEC(2009)1389 +SEC(2009)1390 COM(2009)561 SEC(2009)1391pdf(238 kB)
9/23/09 Proposal for a Regulation on Community macro-
prudential oversight of the financial system and 
establishing a European Systemic Risk Board
SEC(2009)1234 +SEC(2009)1235 COM(2009)499 SEC(2009)1236pdf
9/23/09 Proposal for a Decision entrusting the European 
Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the 
functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board
SEC(2009)1234 +SEC(2009)1235 COM(2009)500 SEC(2009)1236pdf
9/23/09 Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
European Banking Authority
SEC(2009)1234 +SEC(2009)1235 COM(2009)501 SEC(2009)1236pdf
9/23/09 Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
SEC(2009)1234 +SEC(2009)1235 COM(2009)502 SEC(2009)1236pdf
9/23/09 Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European 
Securities and Markets Authority
SEC(2009)1234 +SEC(2009)1235 COM(2009)503 SEC(2009)1236pdf
12/16/10 Proposal for a Regulation establishing technical 
requirements for credit transfers and direct 
debits in euros and amending Regulation (EC) No. 
924/2009
SEC(2010)1584pdf(713 kB) COM(2010)775pdf(103 kB) SEC(2010)1586pdf(247 kB)
12/8/10 Communication: Reinforcing sanctioning regimes 
in the financial services sector
SEC(2010)1496pdf(213 kB) COM(2010)716pdf(82 kB) SEC(2010)1498pdf(335 
kB)
9/15/10 Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and 
certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps
SEC(2010)1055pdf(804 kB) COM(2010)482pdf(142 kB) SEC(2010)1057pdf(409 
kB)
9/15/10 Proposal for a Regulation on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories
SEC(2010)1058pdf(2 MB) COM(2010)484pdf(211 kB) SEC(2010)1060pdf(202 
kB)
8/16/10 Proposal for a Directive amending Directives 
98/78/EC, 2002/87/EC and 2006/48/EC as 
regards the supplementary supervision of financial 
entities in a financial conglomerate
SEC(2010)979pdf(346 kB) COM(2010)433pdf(108 kB) SEC(2010)980pdf(171 kB)
7/12/10 Proposal for a Directive on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes (recast)
SEC(2010)834pdf(2 MB) COM(2010)368pdf(342 kB) SEC(2010)836pdf(270 kB)
7/12/10 White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes SEC(2010)840pdf(9 MB) COM(2010)370pdf(65 kB) SEC(2010)842pdf(214 kB)
7/12/10 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 97/9/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on investor-compensation schemes
SEC(2010)845pdf(616 kB) COM(2010)371 SEC(2010)847pdf(475 kB)
6/2/10 Proposal for a Regulation on amending Regulation 
(EC) 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies
SEC(2010)678pdf(256 kB) COM(2010)289pdf(454 kB) SEC(2010)680pdf(291 
kB)+
12/7/11 Proposal for a Regulation on European Venture 
Capital Funds
SEC(2011)1515 COM(2011)860 SEC(2011)1517pdf(338 kB)
11/15/11 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 
2009/65/EC on the co-ordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to undertakings of collective investment in 
transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 
2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds 
Managers in respect of the excessive reliance on 
credit ratings
SEC(2011)1354 COM(2011)746 SEC(2011)1356(475 kB)
10/25/11 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 
2004/109/EC on the harmonization of 
transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
Commission Directive 2007/14/EC
SEC(2011)1279 COM(2011)683 SEC(2011)1281(302 kB)
10/20/11 Proposal for a Directive on markets in financial 
instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (Recast 
- MIFID)
SEC(2011)1226pdf(3 MB) COM(2011)656 SEC(2011)1228pdf(419 kB)
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Date Title IA ref. Proposal Ref IAB/RSB opinion ref.
7/20/11 Proposal for a Regulation on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firms
SEC(2011)949 COM(2011)452 SEC(2011)951pdf(281 kB)
7/20/11 Proposal for a Directive on the access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the 
supplementary supervision of credit institutions, 
insurance undertakings and investment firms in a 
financial conglomerate
SEC(2011)952 COM(2011)453 SEC(2011)954pdf(303 kB)
7/18/11 Commission Recommendation on access to a basic 
payment account
SEC(2011)906pdf(814 kB) C(2011)4977pdf(35 kB) SEC(2011)908pdf(349 kB)
12/19/12 Commission delegated Regulation supplementing 
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council with regard to exemptions, 
general operating conditions, depositaries, 
leverage, transparency and supervision
SWD(2012)386pdf(687 kB) C(2012)8370pdf(553 kB) SEC(2012)645pdf(616 kB)
7/5/12 Commission delegated Regulation supplementing 
Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on short selling 
and certain aspects of credit default swaps with 
regard to definitions, the calculation of net short 
positions, covered sovereign credit default swaps, 
notification thresholds, liquidity thresholds for 
suspending restrictions, significant falls in the value 
of financial instruments and adverse events
SWD(2012)198pdf(493 kB) C(2012)4529pdf(93 kB) SEC(2012)417pdf(462 kB)
7/3/12 Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on key information 
documents for investment products
SWD(2012)187 COM(2012)352 SEC(2012)403pdf(449 kB)
7/3/12 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 2009/65/
EC on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings 
for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS) as regards depositary functions, 
remuneration policies and sanctions
SWD(2012)185 COM(2012)350 SEC(2012)402pdf(284 kB)
7/3/12 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on insurance mediation (recast)
SWD(2012)191 COM(2012)360 SEC(2012)412pdf(279 kB)
6/6/12 Proposal for a Directive establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
and investment firms and amending Council 
Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/
EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation 
(EU) No. 1093/2010
SWD(2012)166 COM(2012)280 SEC(2012)353pdf(454 kB)
3/30/12 Commission delegated Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 809/2004 as regards the 
format and the content of the prospectus, the base 
prospectus, the summary and the final terms and 
as regards the disclosure requirements
SWD(2012)77pdf(266 kB) C(2012)2086pdf(342 kB) SEC(2012)226pdf(401 kB)
3/7/12 Proposal for a Regulation on improving securities 
settlement in the European Union and on central 
securities depositories (CSDs) and amending 
Directive 98/26/EC
SWD(2012)22 COM(2012)73 SEC(2012)131pdf(408 kB)
9/18/13 Proposal for a Regulation on indices used as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial 
contracts
SWD(2013)336 COM(2013)641 SEC(2013)479pdf(261 kB)
9/4/13 Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on monetary funds
SWD(2013)315 COM(2013)615 SEC(2013)452pdf(292 kB)
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Date Title IA ref. Proposal Ref IAB/RSB opinion ref.
6/26/13 Proposal for a Regulation on European long-term 
investment funds
SWD(2013)230 COM(2013)462 SEC(2013)368pdf(246 kB)
7/24/13 Proposal for a Regulation on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions
SWD(2013)288 COM(2013)550 SEC(2013)434pdf(307 kB)
5/8/13 Proposal for a Directive on the comparability 
of fees related to payment accounts, payment 
account switching and access to payment accounts 
with basic features
SWD(2013)164 COM(2013)266 SEC(2013)250pdf(223 kB) 
10/10/14 Commission delegated Regulation supplementing 
Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit 
of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance 
(Solvency II)
SWD(2014)309pdf(2 MB) C(2014)7230pdf(2 MB) SEC(2014)520pdf(111 kB) 
1/29/14 Proposal for a Regulation on reporting and 
transparency of securities financing transactions
SWD(2014)30 COM(2014)40 SEC(2014)79pdf(119 kB) 
1/29/14 Proposal for a Regulation on structural measures 
improving the resilience of EU credit institutions
SWD(2014)30 COM(2014)43 SEC(2014)79pdf(119 kB) 
9/30/15 Proposal for a Regulation laying down 
common rules on securitization and creating 
a European framework for simple, transparent 
and standardized securitization and amending 
Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/
EU and Regulations (EC) 1060/2009 and (EU) 
648/2012
SWD(2015)185pdf(3 MB) COM(2015)472pdf(2 MB) SEC(2015)382pdf(90 kB)
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ANNEX 2: EX POST EVALUATIONS IN THE FIELD OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Title: Review of Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC (evaluation related study)
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2010
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (The review of the operation of Directive 2004 109 EC emerging issues accompaning document 
to the report.pdf) 
-  Evaluation report - English (Report on the operation of Directive 2004 109 EC.pdf)
Title: Ex ante Evaluation of financing of EFRAG
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2009
Documents:
- Evaluation report - English (financing-decision-evaluation_en.pdf) 
Title: Evaluation of the economic impacts of the Financial Services Action Plan
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2009
Documents:
- Evaluation report - English (FSAP_economic_impact_en.pdf) 
- Annex - English (FSAP_cost_of_compliance_en.pdf)
Title: Evaluation of Conditional Access Directive (CAD)
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2008
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (Final evaluation report EN.pdf) 
-  Evaluation report - English (Study on the impact of the CAD - FINAL REPORT December 2007.pdf) 
-  Executive summary - English (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (Final evaluation report ANNEX EN.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (ANNEX I.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (ANNEX II.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (ANNEX III.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (ANNEX IV ver novemebr2007.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (CAD Study Presentation.pdf)
38
Title: FSAP Evaluation. Part 1: Process and Implementation
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2007
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (070124_part1_en.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (070124_annex_b_en.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (070124_annex_a_en.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (070124_annex_c_en.pdf) 
-  Annex - Français (070124_summary_en.pdf)
Title: Evaluation of FINUSE
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2007
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (Final Report.pdf)
Title: Evaluation of Financial Collateral Arrangements Directive
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2006
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (COMM_NATIVE_COM_2006_0833_F_EN_ACTE.pdf) 
-  Annex - English (AnnexFCD.pdf)
Title: Evaluation application to legal profession 2nd Money laundering Directive (91/308/EEC)
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2006
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (SEC_2006_1793.pdf)
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Title: Evaluation of the E-Money Directive 2000/46/EC
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2006
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (External evaluation report.pdf) 
-  Evaluation report - English (Final document - Commission Staff Working Document.pdf)
Title: Evaluation report on the Settlement Finality Directive 98/26/EC
Directorate General: FISMA - Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
Year: 2005
Documents:
-  Evaluation report - English (1142.pdf)
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ANNEX 3: SCORECARD ANALYSIS OF THE 36 IAS CARRIED OUT IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR BETWEEN 2003 AND 2011
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL
IA number 2 1 2 1 6 8 9 7 36
Policy options
Considers the zero option 1 1 2 1 6 8 6 7 32
Considers some alternative that is not the 
status quo 2 1 2 1 6 8 6 7 33
Considers improvements in implementation and 
enforcement 0 0 1 1 3 5 5 5 20
Considers reliance on international standards or 
private governance schemes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Considers self-regulation 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 3 12
Considers the provision of information and 
guidelines 0 0 2 1 4 4 4 2 17
Considers market-based instruments 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 11
Considers co-regulation 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 4
Considers prescriptive regulatory actions 
(command and control) 2 0 2 1 6 8 6 7 32
Preferred Policy Option
IA indicates one or more preferred options 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 13
Chooses the zero option 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chooses prescriptive regulatory actions 
(command and control) 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 13
Consultation
IA reports consultation 2 1 2 1 6 8 5 7 32
IA presents the different positions expressed 
and how they were considered 2 1 2 1 1 6 5 6 24
The IA used the consultation to gather factual 
data 2 1 1 0 3 0 2 0 9
Data
IA reports information on data sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 13
IA reports information on data collection 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
Estimation of costs
Provided best estimate of total cost 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Provided range for total costs 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Estimation of benefits
Provided best estimate of total benefits 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
Provided range for total benefits 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Comparison of Costs and Benefits
Calculated net benefits 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
Calculated cost-effectiveness 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Evaluation of alternatives
Cost-effectiveness of alternatives 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Net benefits of alternatives 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Risk assessment
IA performs risk assessment 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3
Risk-risk analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Affected parties
IA clarifies who is affected by the regulation
EU citizens 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 0 13
Citizens of a specific territory 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Specific categories of citizens 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 0 5
Consumers 0 1 0 1 3 4 5 1 15
The economic sector at large 2 1 1 1 5 6 6 7 29
A few large firms 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 5
SMEs 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
The not-for-profit sector 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Non-EU parties (including third countries) 1 0 0 0 1 5 3 2 12
The EU as a whole 1 1 0 0 4 8 3 7 24
The member states 1 1 2 0 5 8 5 6 28
Other 1 1 2 1 5 7 2 0 19
IA clarifies the immediate beneficiaries of the regulation
EU citizens 1 0 1 1 3 5 2 0 13
Citizens of a specific territory 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Specific categories of citizens 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 0 6
Consumers 0 1 1 1 3 6 5 1 18
The economic sector at large 2 1 1 1 5 5 5 7 27
A few large firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
SMEs 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
The not-for-profit sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-EU parties (including third countries) 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 2 8
The EU as a whole 1 0 0 0 0 8 3 7 19
The member states 1 0 1 0 0 8 4 6 20
Other 0 0 2 1 3 7 1 0 14
Economic impacts explicitly assessed
Competitiveness 2 0 1 1 3 7 2 4 20
Competition 2 1 1 1 5 7 3 4 24
SMEs 1 0 0 1 4 7 4 5 22
SMEs (“SME Test”) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investment/innovation 0 0 1 1 4 6 5 5 22
Single market 0 1 2 1 4 7 5 1 21
GDP/growth 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 3
Trade 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 4
Inflation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Economic Impacts on Third Countries 0 0 0 0 2 6 3 2 13
Macroeconomic impacts 0 0 0 1 2 5 2 1 11
Administrative burdens (no SCM) 1 0 0 0 3 2 5 5 16
Administrative burdens (SCM) 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 7
Does IA quantify administrative costs or only 
administrative burdens? 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
Does IA quantify administrative burdens for 
businesses? 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 4 9
Does IA quantify administrative burdens for 
citizens? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Does IA quantify administrative burdens for 
public administrations? 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 4
Other 1 0 0 1 4 5 4 6 21
 Monitoring and evaluation
The IA contains a section on monitoring and 
evaluation 2 1 2 1 6 7 6 7 32
The IA discusses a review clause for the 
proposal 0 1 2 0 6 3 5 1 18
The IA contains indicators for evaluating the 
proposal overtime 0 1 1 0 6 5 3 5 21
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ON THE ROLE & FUTURE OF CALGARY’S COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS
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Brian Conger, Jyoti Gondek and Pernille Goodbrand | October 2016
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Jennifer Winter and Sarah Dobson | June 2016
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